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Comment 9: Comment on Chapter 13
RO B E R T KO L LMANN
1. General comments
Under EMU,monetary policy is oriented towards union-wide economic
conditions, and cannot effectively address country-speciﬁc macroeco-
nomic disturbances. Should national ﬁscal policy be used more actively,
for stabilizing individual economies, now that exchange rate changes
among member countries are no longer possible? Several recent studies
answer this important normative question, based on sticky-price (New
Keynesian) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models
with rigorous microeconomic foundations – see Galí and Monacelli
(2008), Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Adão et al. (2006), Kirsanova
et al. (2007), Ferrero (2007) and Forlati (2007).1 That research suggests
that the adjustment of government purchases and tax rates in response
to country-speciﬁc disturbances may noticeably improve economic wel-
fare, in a monetary union; constraints on ﬁscal policy (ceilings on
budget deﬁcits or debt levels) can thus lower welfare. The research
also shows that welfare-maximizing ﬁscal policy depends on the eco-
nomic structure of the member countries, especially on the nature of
market frictions and of shocks, and on what ﬁscal policy instruments
can be used (spending or tax rates). However, rigorous analysis of these
key issues is still in its infancy – the available studies use very stylized
models. Research based on more realistic models is needed to permit
reliable operational ﬁscal policy advice.
The chapter by Christopher Allsopp andDavid Vines is an interesting
contribution to the literature on ﬁscal policy in a monetary union.
Its main merit is the use of a sticky-price DSGE model with a richer,
more realistic policy transmission mechanism. A small economy in a
monetary union is considered. The country’s government levies an
income tax, purchases local goods, and issues debt. The tax rate is
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constant. Government purchases are used as a stabilization tool.
Government purchases are set as a function (feedback rule) of the
country’s inﬂation rate, terms of trade (deﬁned as the domestic price
level divided by the foreign price level) and public debt.
2. The main contributions
The methodological contribution is that the authors use a model which
incorporates the following two key features (that are not considered by
the studies cited above):
i. a fraction of households faces binding nominal credit constraints;
ii. inﬂation is persistent, due to a Phillips curve with a backward-
looking component.
Credit-constrained households cannot smooth consumption intertem-
porally. A rise in the price level lowers the real value of their debt, and
triggers a rise in consumption. Thus, price level changes have a power-
ful effect on consumption, and hence on real activity, in the model
here (output is demand determined, in the short run). Also, credit-
constrained households adjust their consumption one-to-one to
changes in their current factor income. By contrast, the related literature
on monetary unions discussed above assumes free household borrow-
ing and lending; those models capture less well the empirical fact that
consumption tracks disposable income very closely (Campbell and
Mankiw (1989)). Galí et al. (2007) show that a model in which house-
holds cannot smooth consumption captures much better the empirical
responses of aggregate demand to government spending shocks. Several
recent large macroeconomic models developed by policy making insti-
tutions thus allow for credit-constrained households (e.g. Erceg et al.
(2006), Ratto et al. (2008)). Hence, it clearly makes sense to use a model
with credit constraints for normative ﬁscal policy analysis.
Inﬂation persistence is likewise a key feature of the data (e.g. Smets
and Wouters (2007)). Previous analyses of ﬁscal policy in monetary
unions have mostly assumed price setting à la Calvo (1983) – which
implies that inﬂation has a purely forward-looking dynamic. By con-
trast, Allsopp and Vines assume that a fraction of ﬁrms index their
prices to lagged inﬂation and output, so that aggregate domestic inﬂa-
tion depends on lagged inﬂation and output (as well as on current
output and expected future inﬂation).2
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The analytical contribution of the paper is as follows. The authors
demonstrate that a model with the two features described above may
exhibit boom-bust cycles in response to a persistent shock which
lowers the external competitiveness of the country being studied.
This happens because backward-looking price setting implies pro-
tracted deviations of the terms of trade, output and employment
from efﬁcient levels. The presence of credit-constrained households
magniﬁes these effects. Consider a shock that lowers the external
competitiveness of the small country studied in the model. The
model predicts that the shock triggers a subsequent gradual fall of
the country’s price level, and thus of its terms of trade; due to inﬂation
inertia, the terms of trade may overshoot their long-run equilibrium
level, during the adjustment process. As the union-wide central bank
does not change the interest rate, in response to a country-speciﬁc
disturbance, the gradual fall in the country’s price level during the
adjustment process is associated with a rise in its real interest rate (in
terms of the local good), which dampens local output. The model
predicts that, with a sufﬁciently high proportion of credit-constrained
households, and a sufﬁciently strong backward-looking component of
the Phillips curve, the terms of trade and real activity exhibit cyclical
oscillations (i.e. boom-bust cycles). Thus, both of these two key fea-
tures of the model play a role in leading to such an outcome.
The policy prescription of the chapter is that government purchases in
the small country should be cut initially, when a sustained adverse
shock to competitiveness occurs, in order to speed up the fall of domes-
tic prices, but that government purchases should be increased once
the terms of trade approach their long-run post-shock equilibrium
level, in order to prevent the competitiveness of the economy from
overshooting.
How important is this analysis? The authors provide empirical plots,
at the beginning of their paper, that suggest that some countries entered
EMU in an uncompetitive position, that others entered in a too-
competitive position, and that there has been overshoot in response to
this problem. However, there is a need for more systematic empirical
work, to test the overshoot hypothesis. Empirical research (using VAR
methods) on the effect of ﬁscal shocks in open economies by Corsetti
and Müller (2006), Beetsma et al. (2008), Ravn et al. (2007), and Kim
and Roubini (2007) ﬁnds no evidence of boom-bust cycles. But those
studies are all based on data for countries with ﬂoating exchange rate
554 Robert Kollmann
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP/633865/WORKINGFOLDER/BTI/9789279098420CHS09.3D 555 [552–556] 10.11.2009 12:15PM
regimes – whereas the overshoot analyzed by Allsopp and Vines is
caused by asymmetric shocks within a monetary union.
3. Suggestions
The chapter focuses on the consequences of an exogenous change in
external competitiveness. In future research, the authors should bemore
explicit about the causes of that disturbance – for example, it may
matter a great deal for policy whether a worsening of competitiveness
is due to an adverse supply shock (negative technology or labor supply
shock), or whether it reﬂects a “cost-push shock” (an increase in the
market power of local monopolistic ﬁrms that allows them to charge
higher prices). In the former case, the Pareto-efﬁcient output level drops,
and ﬁscal policy should seek to bring output down to the efﬁcient level;
in the latter case, by contrast, ﬁscal policy should stimulate output (as a
rise in market power depresses output below its efﬁcient level).
Unfortunately, the paper does not provide stochastic model simula-
tions. Stochastic simulations with the standard set of disturbances
considered in macroeconomics (e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007))
would be needed to characterize the welfare-maximizing ﬁscal policy
feedback rule. And such simulations would also allow evaluating how
well the model captures the actual behavior of key macro variables
within EMU.
As discussed above, a model with credit-constrained households
generates a more realistic policy transmission mechanism. However, a
fully satisfactory analysis of the transmission mechanism requires phy-
sical investment – which is not considered here (and also not in the
related literature cited above).
It would also be important to allow for the simultaneous adjustment
of government purchases and taxes, in response to shocks (recall that
the chapter assumes a constant tax rate). Ferrero (2007) considers a
model of a monetary union, in which the income tax is used as a policy
instrument (while government purchases are exogenous); he shows
that this tax is a powerful stabilization tool. Adão et al. (2006) con-
sider a model of a monetary union, in which governments can use
income taxes and consumption taxes as policy instruments. In their
setup, the second-best efﬁcient allocation that obtains under ﬂexible
prices can also be achieved under sticky prices – irrespective of the
exchange rate regime. Essentially, Adão and coauthors show that the
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adjustment of country-speciﬁc consumption taxes can be used as a
substitute for exchange rate changes. Thus optimal ﬁscal policy can
fully eliminate the welfare cost of a monetary union. Adão et al.
conclude hence that, when a sufﬁciently rich set of tax instruments is
available, “every currency area is an optimal currency area!”
Allsopp andVines’s policy proposal clearly requires reliable estimates
of the response of the terms of trade to government spending shocks.
There is much controversy in the empirical literature, regarding that
response. Like standard macro models, the Allsopp-Vines model pre-
dicts that a rise in government purchases improves a country’s terms of
trade. The empirical research on ﬁscal shocks by Corsetti and Müller
(2006) and Beetsma et al. (2008) reports estimated responses that are
consistent with the standard prediction. However, Ravn et al. (2007),
and Kim and Roubini (2007) ﬁnd that a rise in government purchases
has the opposite effect (the terms of trade worsen). As mentioned above,
these four empirical studies use data for countries with a ﬂoating
exchange rate. There is thus urgent need for empirical research on the
effect of ﬁscal shocks in a monetary union.
4. Summary
In summary, Allsopp and Vines provide a valuable contribution to the
recent literature on ﬁscal policy in amonetary union. Clearly, muchmore
theoretical and empirical research on this important topic is needed.
Notes
1. For related work on the optimal monetary/ﬁscal policy mix, in closed
economies with nominal rigidities, see, among others, Benigno and
Woodford (2006), Schmitt-Grohé andUribe (2006) andKollmann (2008).
2. Optimal ﬁscal policy in a model with such a “hybrid” Phillips curve (with
backward- and forward-looking components) has recently been studied by
Kirsanova et al. (2007) – but that paper abstracts from credit constraints.
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